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INTRODUCTION
No one born in the last eighty years has seen an original work cre1
ated in her lifetime fall into the public domain. Each time the term
of copyright protection has been due to expire, Congress has passed
2
another extension. This has led some scholars to suggest that Congress is effectively granting these works a perpetual copyright, in violation of the Constitution’s requirement that such protection only be
3
granted for “limited Times.” Although the Supreme Court has re†
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1
More precisely, no work has fallen into the public domain so long as the copyright holder maintained her exclusive rights. Any pre-1976 Copyright Act works whose
initial twenty-eight-year term of protection expired might have passed into the public
domain if the copyright holder chose not to exercise the renewal option. See Act of
Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 23, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080 (providing for a twenty-eight-year term
of protection for copyrighted works and a twenty-eight-year renewal term) (repealed
1976); see also Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541, 2572 (codified
as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000)) (instituting terms of copyright protection that
extend for the life of the author plus fifty years for works created on or after January 1,
1978). But see Copyright Renewal Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-307, 106 Stat. 264, 266
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (2000)) (making copyright renewal automatic for copyrights in their first term on January 1, 1978). Similarly, copyright owners
are free to submit their works to the public domain prior to their expiration. See, e.g.,
Creative Commons, Public Domain Dedication, http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/publicdomain/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2006) (providing a model license whereby
a copyright owner may release a protected work into the public domain).
2
By some counts, this has occurred eleven times since 1962. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN
CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 134 (2004) (“Eleven times in the last forty years,
Congress has extended the terms of existing copyrights . . . .”).
3
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power “[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”); Brief for Pe-
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4

jected this argument as applied to the current framework, the constitutionality of future, more dramatic extensions remains an open question. Moreover, given the singular trajectory of congressional action
towards ever-increasing duration, an eventual collision with the outer
bounds of “limited Times” seems likely. This Comment argues that,
rather than resisting this trend, Congress should instead follow the
progression to its natural conclusion and enact a regime of indefinitely renewable copyright.
Such a suggestion is anathema to the many scholars who view the
ultimate expiration of copyright as a public entitlement and the repeated copyright extensions by Congress as perpetually depriving the
5
public domain. Yet this conception of the public domain is unduly
narrow. Rather than viewing these extensions as Lucy continually
pulling the football away just as Charlie Brown is about to kick it, consider instead the similar case of a young child learning to swim. Her
father takes a step deeper into the water and says, “Swim to me.” Just
as she is about to reach him, her father moves farther back and says
again, “Swim to me.” This process is repeated until the child discovers
that she is able to swim on her own, and thus, the tool she thought she
needed (the safety of her father’s arms) is in fact no longer required.
In a similar fashion, current copyright law gives artists substantial
freedom to appropriate from a protected work at the moment of its
6
creation, via doctrines such as fair use and the idea/expression di7
chotomy. It is, of course, impossible to know how life would have
been different if revisions to the law had not allowed copyright owners

titioners at 18-32, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618) (arguing that
Congress’s attempt to extend copyright protection retroactively violates the Constitution’s “limited Times” provision).
4
See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 193-94 (holding that Congress did not violate the “limited
Times” constraint by enacting a statute that extended the duration of protection for
already copyrighted works by twenty years).
5
See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 2, at 215-16 (“[I]f Congress has the power to extend
existing terms [of copyright protection], then the Constitution’s requirement that
terms be ‘limited’ will have no practical effect . . . [and] Congress can achieve what the
Constitution plainly forbids . . . .”); JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 77-78 (2001)
(describing how copyright principles have been reformulated during the past generation in “ways that have expanded copyright’s scope and blinded many of us to the dangers that arise from protecting too much, too expansively for too long”).
6
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (describing the fair use exceptions to the exclusive
rights of copyright holders); see also infra notes 32-35 and accompanying text (discussing the fair use doctrine).
7
See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 100-01 (1879) (establishing the idea/
expression dichotomy); see also infra notes 36-37 and accompanying text (discussing the
idea/expression dichotomy).
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to keep works of the last eighty years from entering the public do8
main. But the arts have thrived even in the absence of copyright expiration, suggesting that artists have “learned to swim” in a world
without what has traditionally been thought of as an expanding public
domain.
There is an oft-told tale in the literature of arbitration, describing
two brothers involved in a highly contentious dispute over the owner9
ship of an orange. The arbitrator eventually discovers that both siblings can be appeased, as one brother simply wants to squeeze the
fruit for its juice, while the other seeks only the peel in order to make
marmalade. While the Coase Theorem might have suggested that it
10
would not matter which brother initially received the orange, the
parable reflects the reality that irrationality will often lead to market
11
failure, whether the participants are feuding siblings or artists fearful
12
that new technology will destroy their livelihood.
This Comment

8

It is important to note that the words ‘art’ and ‘science’ have different connotations today than they did when the Framers wrote that Congress would have the power
to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
In 1787, the word ‘science’ “referred to knowledge in general, in all fields of knowledge,” whereas “[w]hat we mean today by ‘science’ was then called natural philosophy.
It was quite clearly intended by the authors of the Constitution that copyright, not patents, was intended to promote science, and the province of rights granted to inventors
respecting their ‘Discoveries’ was to promote the ‘useful Arts.’” Giles Sutherland Rich,
My Favorite Things, 35 IDEA 1, 2 (1994).
9
See, e.g., Luis Miguel Diaz, Yes-Talk Rule Prevails over Non-Talk Rule in Mediation, in
1 INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LITIGATION & ARBITRATION 425, 429 (PLI Litig. & Admin.
Practice, Course Handbook Series No. H-704, 2004) (describing a different variation of
the orange/marmalade story). For a modern gloss, see CMS, CMS GUIDE TO ADR 10
(2003) (comparing the orange/marmalade story to a long-running intellectual property dispute that was eventually settled through arbitration).
10
See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 6-8 (1960) (suggesting
that resources will be used by the party who values them more, regardless of any legal
determination of ownership).
11
See Jeanne L. Schroeder, The End of the Market: A Psychoanalysis of Law and Economics, 112 HARV. L. REV. 483, 537 (1998) (discussing the role of irrationality in the
Coase Theorem).
12
For example, Jack Valenti, the former chief executive of the Motion Picture Association of America, once claimed that “the VCR is to the American film producer
and the American public as the Boston strangler is to the woman home alone.” Home
Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R. 4783, H.R. 4794, H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250,
H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin.
of Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 8 (1982) (statement of Jack Valenti).
Despite these initial fears, the home video market has grown to become a vital revenue
stream for the motion picture industry. See, e.g., Di Mari Ricker, “Rio” Raises Copyright
Concerns, ENT. L. & FIN., Dec. 1998, at 1, 1 (noting that the introduction of the VCR
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proposes a copyright schema intended to reduce irrationality and
maximize social wealth by strengthening the rights most important to
traditional content owners, while simultaneously securing the appro13
priation rights most important to consumers and follow-on artists.
The ultimate insight of this Comment is that, by making copyright
protection renewable indefinitely but narrowing the scope of protection to cover only those works that would act as market substitutes for
the original work, the realignment of rights and privileges would reflect the current trajectory of the law, and moreover would better
serve the dual interests of copyright owners and content users.
This Comment has four parts. Part I traces the evolution of
American copyright law. Part II examines the merits of an indefinitely
renewable copyright regime. Part III suggests modifications to traditional copyright doctrines that would complement an indefinitely renewable copyright system. Part IV examines various constitutional
impediments to creating an indefinitely renewable term of copyright
protection.
I. THE STORY SO FAR: COPYRIGHT LAW, 1790-TODAY
The history of American copyright law has generally been one of
expansion. Although one might expect a legislative body traditionally
suspicious of monopolies to continually chip away at the monopolis14
tic property rights given to copyright owners, for the most part Congress has tended to broaden the scope and duration of protection afforded to authors of creative works.
This Part traces the chronological development of copyright protection, with special emphasis placed on the evolution of protectable
subject matter, infringement by derivative works, and the meaning of
“limited Times.” This examination is not simply intended to establish

“spawned a new industry of videocassette rentals and sales that generated more revenues for Hollywood than the sale of movie tickets”).
13
Follow-on artists are artists who incorporate pre-existing works into their own
creations. See, e.g., Press Release, Negativland, U2 Negativland: The Case from Our
Side (Nov. 10, 1991), reprinted in NEGATIVLAND, FAIR USE: THE STORY OF THE LETTER
U AND THE NUMERAL 2, at 21-25 (1995) (describing Negativland’s creative process as
follow-on artists).
14
Intellectual property protection does not provide the holder with a right to use
the property, but rather with a right to exclude others from using it. Thus, while copyright protection might confer some monopolistic benefits, it is not a monopoly in the
traditional sense. For a general discussion of these ideas, see Edmund W. Kitch, Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L.
REV. 1727 (2000); John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas, WIRED, Mar. 1994, at 84.
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the current state of the law but rather to demonstrate the trajectory
along these axes, in order to speculate on their ultimate bounds.
The first federal copyright statute (one of the earliest pieces of
legislation enacted by the First Congress in 1790) vested in the author
of “any map, chart, book or books . . . the sole right and liberty of
printing, reprinting, publishing and vending [those works] . . . for the
term of fourteen years from the time of recording the title thereof in
15
the clerk’s office . . . . This copyright protection could be renewed
for one additional fourteen-year term if the author was still alive at the
16
end of the first term.
These initial limitations—restricting what constituted copyrightable subject matter, providing a short duration of protection, and requiring registration—all seem logically grounded in the utilitarian
17
philosophy expressed in the Promote Progress Clause and yet reflect
18
the Framers’ general distaste for granting commercial monopolies.
In 1831, the subject matter of copyright was expanded to include
“musical composition[s],” and the grant of protection was increased
to twenty-eight years (again renewable for an additional fourteen-year
19
term). However, an author’s rights remained limited to publication
20
21
and copying. Courts did not recognize derivative rights as a distinct entity, instead generally construing the scope of protection quite
22
narrowly. For example, in Stowe v. Thomas, Harriet Beecher Stowe
23
unsuccessfully argued that a German translation of Uncle Tom’s Cabin
15

Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (repealed 1831).
Id.
17
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
18
See Tyler T. Ochoa & Mark Rose, The Anti-Monopoly Origins of the Patent and Copyright Clause, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 909, 922-28 (2002) (describing the
Framers’ concerns regarding intellectual property monopolies). Indeed, Thomas Jefferson explicitly suggested that the Bill of Rights provide “clearly and without the aid
of sophisms for . . . [a] restriction against monopolies.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson
to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), in 1 THE REPUBLIC OF LETTERS: THE
CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON AND JAMES MADISON, 1776-1826, at
512 (James Morton Smith ed., 1995).
19
Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, §§ 1-2, 4 Stat. 436, 436 (repealed 1870).
20
Id. § 1.
21
In other words, courts did not recognize the right to transform copyrighted material into a new work, such as making a postcard featuring a painting, a movie based
on a play, or a sequel to a novel.
22
See Amy B. Cohen, When Does a Work Infringe the Derivative Works Right of a Copyright Owner?, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 623, 626 (1999) (“Even when musical compositions were added to the list of protectable works in 1831, the author of such works
was not given a right to control performances of those works . . . .”).
23
HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, UNCLE TOM’S CABIN (Univ. of Va. Library) (1852).
16
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24

infringed her copyright in the novel.
The court, reasoning that
copyright protection only applied to literal, word-for-word copying,
rejected Stowe’s infringement claims, holding that “[a] translation
may, in loose phraseology, be called a transcript or copy of her
thought or conceptions, but in no correct sense can it be called a copy
25
of her book.”
However, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, Congress
26
began to grant authors certain limited rights in derivative works. In
1856, copyright holders were given the “sole right to act, perform, or
represent [their original work of authorship], or cause it be acted,
27
performed, or represented, on any stage or public place.”
This
“public performance” right was expanded in an 1870 statute that allowed “authors [to] reserve the right to dramatize or translate their
28
own works.”
Complementing this increase in protection afforded to authors
was a judicial recognition of what has come to be known as the first
sale doctrine. According to this principle, an author’s interest in her
intellectual property is distinct from consumers’ personal property
rights in legitimately purchased items containing the author’s creative
29
30
expression. Following steady approval by the lower federal courts,

24

23 F. Cas. 201 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 13,514).
Id. at 208.
26
See Cohen, supra note 22, at 627 (discussing Congress’s gradual expansion of the
scope of copyright protection).
27
Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138, 139 (repealed 1870).
28
Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212 (repealed 1909). The reservation requirement was subsequently dropped, and the dramatization right became
automatic in 1891. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 565, § 1, 26 Stat. 1106, 1107 (repealed
1909).
29
See Cohen, supra note 22, at 629-31 (discussing the first sale doctrine). For
modern glosses on the topic, see Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L’Anza Research Int’l,
Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 146-51 (1998) (applying the first sale doctrine to imported copies of
protected works); R. Anthony Reese, The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks,
44 B.C. L. REV. 577, 578, 610-15 (2003) (examining the impact of technological change
on the first sale doctrine).
30
See, e.g., Kipling v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 120 F. 631, 634 (2d Cir. 1903) (holding
that the defendants did not commit copyright infringement by selling a set of the
plaintiff’s works that they purchased from him, even though a previous compilation of
the plaintiff’s works had already been copyrighted by a different publisher); Doan v.
Am. Book Co., 105 F. 772, 776 (7th Cir. 1901) (concluding that the appellant did not
infringe upon the appellee’s copyright because “[t]he sale of [the copyrighted books]
by the appellee carried with it the ordinary incidents of ownership in personal property . . . and the appellants, purchasing them, had the right to resell them”); Harrison
v. Maynard, Merrill & Co., 61 F. 689, 691 (2d Cir. 1894) (“[T]he right to restrain the
sale of a particular copy of [a] book . . . has gone when the owner of the copyright and
25
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the Supreme Court formally endorsed the first sale doctrine in BobbsMerrill Co. v. Straus, holding that the sole right to “vend” a work protected by copyright law extended only to the initial sale of any embodiment of an intellectual property; thus “[t]he purchaser of a book,
once sold by authority of the owner of the copyright, may sell it again,
31
although he could not publish a new edition of it.”
In addition to these rights in tangible property, courts in the midnineteenth century also began to hold that certain types of copying
and borrowing were not violations of an author’s exclusive rights. In
Folsom v. Marsh, Justice Story first articulated the principle (later to
become the fair use doctrine) that “a fair and bona fide abridgment of
the [copyrighted] work” might not be deemed an impermissible in32
fringement. As the name implies, the fair use doctrine is grounded
in the equitable notion that certain forms of appropriation—for example, copying portions of a protected work in order to criticize or
parody it—are inherently reasonable. While an author may not like
having her creative expression lampooned, a parodic work generally
33
does not act as a market substitute for the original. Some scholars
have suggested that the fair use doctrine arose to address the sorts of
uses where an author is most likely to be unwilling to license her work

of that copy has parted with all his title to it, and has conferred an absolute title to the
copy upon a purchaser . . . .”); Clemens v. Estes, 22 F. 899, 900 (C.C.D. Mass. 1885)
(holding that the defendants “had a right to buy, or contract to buy, books from agents
who lawfully obtained them by purchase from the plaintiff or his publishers”); Stowe, 23
F. Cas. at 206-07 (“When [an author] has sold his book, the only property which he
reserves to himself, or which the law gives to him, is the exclusive right to multiply the
copies of that particular combination of characters which exhibits to the eyes of another the ideas intended to be conveyed.”).
31
210 U.S. 339, 350 (1908).
32
9 F. Cas. 342, 349 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (Story, Circuit Justice). Despite the fact that Justice Story suggested the possibility of a fair use defense, the defendant in Folsom, who had reprinted letters written by George Washington that were
first published by the plaintiff, was nevertheless found to have borrowed too much
from the plaintiff’s work. Id. Interestingly, part of Justice Story’s opinion was
grounded in a labor/misappropriation rationale, noting that if “the labors of the
original author are substantially to an injurious extent appropriated by another, that is
sufficient, in point of law, to constitute a piracy pro tanto.” Id. at 348. Nevertheless,
Justice Story’s framework in Folsom formed the basis for subsequent fair use analyses
and remained to a significant degree unchanged as it was ultimately codified by Congress. See Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1525, 1588 (2004) (describing the development of the fair use doctrine); see also
infra note 55 and accompanying text (discussing the codification of fair use).
33
By contrast, bootleg DVDs and CDs are examples of market substitutes that prevent authors from capturing the full market value of their works.

712

[Vol. 154: 705

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
34

for a reasonable fee (such as a criticism and parody). Others (including, recently, the Supreme Court) have suggested that fair use
35
may be required by the First Amendment.
Whatever the rationale, the judicially created doctrines of first sale
and fair use stand out against the general trend of affording copyright
holders increased protection. Moreover, they share a recognition that
certain rights ought to vest in persons other than the author of a
copyrighted work.
Another notable limitation on authors emerged in the late nineteenth century: the Supreme Court, in Baker v. Selden, held that facts
36
and ideas were uncopyrightable. The Court established the idea/
expression dichotomy, holding that while an author’s original expression of an idea is protectable, the underlying idea itself is “the com37
mon property of the whole world.” Despite a general trend towards
38
increasing the types of works that could be protected by copyright,
the Court here announced a clear restriction on copyrightable subject
matter. This again reflects the notion that certain aspects of intellectual property become part of the public domain immediately, rather
than at the expiration of a copyright’s term.
In 1905, President Theodore Roosevelt called on Congress to
completely overhaul the copyright system from the ground up, noting
that the patchwork development of the scheme through statutory
amendments and judicial decisions had produced a confusing and inconsistent system that burdened artists without providing any comparable benefit to the public and that failed to address the many technological advancements that had, by that time, allowed for the

34

See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic
Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1614 (1982)
(“Fair use is one label courts use when they approve a user’s departure from the market.”).
35
See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (noting that copyright law
“incorporates . . . speech-protective purposes and safeguards” and “contains built-in
First Amendment accommodations”); see also Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 20-23 (2001) (discussing the
relationship between fair use and the First Amendment).
36
101 U.S. 99, 100-01 (1879) (holding that “truths of a science” and “methods of
an art” cannot be protected by copyright).
37
Id. at 100.
38
See, e.g., Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60-61 (1884)
(holding that photographs are entitled to copyright protection).
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production of new types of creative works. Congress responded by
40
passing the Copyright Act of 1909 (the 1909 Act).
With the Act,
Congress once again expanded the subject matter of copyrightable
41
works, this time to include “all the writings of an author.” The Act
also eliminated the requirement that works be registered before receiving protection. Following the passage of the Act, all works affixed
with a copyright notice were protected immediately upon publica42
tion.
Congress also responded to judicial trends in the field, for43
mally codifying the first sale doctrine. And, once again, Congress
extended the duration of protection, providing for an initial term of
twenty-eight years followed by a renewal term of an additional twenty44
eight years.
Several notable expansions in the area of copyrightable subject
matter followed the passage of the 1909 Act. In 1912, Congress
45
brought motion pictures within the ambit of copyright protection; in
1952, protection was extended to for-profit public performances of
46
nondramatic literary works; and although during this time Congress
39

As President Theodore Roosevelt told Congress:
Our Copyright laws urgently need revision. They are imperfect in definition,
confused and inconsistent in expression; they omit provision for many articles
which, under modern reproductive processes, are entitled to protection; they
impose hardships upon the copyright proprietor which are not essential to the
fair protection of the public; they are difficult for the courts to interpret and
impossible for the Copyright Office to administer with satisfaction to the public. Attempts to improve them by amendment have been frequent, no less
than twelve acts for the purpose having been passed since the Revised Statutes. To perfect them by further amendment seems impractical. A complete
revision of them is essential.
Message of President Theodore Roosevelt to Congress (Dec. 1905), reprinted in ALAN
LATMAN ET AL., COPYRIGHT FOR THE EIGHTIES 7 (1985).
40
Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (amending and consolidating the existing legislation on copyright law) (repealed 1976).
41
Id. § 4.
42
See id. § 10 (stating that compliance with the provisions of the Act would ensure
protection).
43
See id. § 41 (providing that a copyright is “distinct from the property in the material object copyrighted, and the sale or conveyance, by gift or otherwise, of the material object shall not of itself constitute a transfer of the copyright”).
44
Id. § 23.
45
See Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 356, 37 Stat. 488, 488 (amending the copyright
statute to include protection for “[m]otion-picture photoplays” and “[m]otion pictures
other than photoplays”) (repealed 1976).
46
See Act of July 17, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-575, 66 Stat. 752, 752 (amending the
copyright statute to grant copyright holders the right to “present the copyrighted work
in public for profit if it be a lecture, sermon, address or similar production, or other
nondramatic literary work”) (repealed 1976).
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declined to conform U.S. copyright law to the 1886 Berne Convention
47
(which sought to harmonize international copyright standards), it
did relax the restrictions preventing foreign works from receiving
48
domestic copyright protection.
Yet judges again tempered these expansions with further recognition that some content was beyond protection. In 1942, a federal district court held that certain aspects of storytelling were scénes à
49
faire—features so generic that they were uncopyrightable. Modern
courts commonly define ‘scénes à faire’ as “incidents, characters or
settings which are as a practical matter indispensable, or at least stan50
dard, in the treatment of a given topic.” This doctrine again reflects
the notion that the most crucial building blocks for future creative
works fall outside the scope of copyright protection.
The most recent overhaul of United States copyright law occurred
in 1976, with the passage of the Copyright Act of 1976 (the 1976
51
Act). Congress continued its trend of expanding copyright protection to an ever-broader array of subject matter: “[c]opyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which
they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, ei-

47

Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9,
1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (last revised July 24, 1971)[hereinafter Berne Convention].
One major obstacle to U.S. adoption was that the Berne Convention required signatories to provide certain ‘moral rights’ to authors, in keeping with the European approach to intellectual property, though potentially in conflict with the U.S. Constitution’s explicit utilitarian philosophy. Natalie C. Suhl, Note, Moral Rights Protection in the
United States Under the Berne Convention: A Fictional Work?, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1203, 1212-15 (2002).
48
See, e.g., Act of June 3, 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-84, 63 Stat. 153 (relaxing the copyright provisions governing foreign works) (repealed 1976); Act of July 3, 1926, ch. 743,
44 Stat. 818 (allowing copyright protection for some works not manufactured within
the United States) (repealed 1976).
49
See Cain v. Universal Pictures Co., 47 F. Supp. 1013, 1017 (S.D. Cal. 1942)
(“[S]imilarities and incidental details necessary to the environment or setting of an
action are not the material of which copyrightable originality consists.”). Although this
was the first case to use the phrase “scénes à faire,” judges employed similar reasoning
in cases dating back at least as far as 1913. See, e.g., Bachman v. Belasco, 224 F. 815, 816
(S.D.N.Y. 1913) (“It is to be expected that two playwrights working independently from
a common source may develop similarities in their plots and in their lines . . . .”).
50
Alexander v. Haley, 460 F. Supp. 40, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). For a collection of
cases using the Alexander v. Haley definition of ‘scénes à faire,’ see Leslie A. Kurtz, Copyright: The Scenes a Faire Doctrine, 41 FLA. L. REV. 79, 81 n.8 (1989).
51
See Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101803 (2000)) (revisiting in its entirety the existing law on copyrights).
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ther directly or with the aid of a machine or device.” And yet this
was simultaneously tempered with a codification of the
idea/expression dichotomy, cordoning off from copyright protection
any “idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described,
53
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.” Similarly, Congress formally extended to copyright owners the exclusive right “to
54
prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work,” but
55
again tempered this grant with a codification of the fair use doctrine.
Thus, the exclusive right to prepare derivative works did not prevent
the public from using any copyrighted material “for purposes such as
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple cop56
ies for classroom use), scholarship, or research.”
The 1976 Act highlights other trends as well. The duration of
copyright protection was again extended, replacing the oncerenewable twenty-eight year term with a single term extending for the
57
life of the author plus fifty years. A sunset provision was added to
58
the manufacturing requirement, and the publication requirement
was replaced with the “fixation” requirement (granting protection to
any work of authorship “fixed in any tangible medium of expres59
sion”).
The subject matter of copyrights was expanded again in 1980 to
60
include computer software.
In 1988, Congress ostensibly brought
U.S. copyright law into compliance with the Berne Convention, via
61
The Berne Convention Implementation Act. In 1990, Congress en-

52

Id. § 102(a).
Id. § 102(b).
54
Id. § 106(2).
55
See id. § 107 (providing the concept of fair use as a defense to copyright infringement).
56
Id.
57
Id. § 302(a). Works for hire, as well as anonymous and pseudonymous works,
were awarded protection for a term of seventy-five years from publication or onehundred years from creation, whichever was shorter. Id. § 302(c).
58
Id. § 601.
59
Id. § 102(a).
60
Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028-29.
61
Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 2, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988) (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. § 101). While the Act removed the formal affixation requirement, it did not
create any new ‘moral rights’ rights for artists, but rather asserted that existing U.S. law
already provided sufficient protection to satisfy the Berne requirements. See Suhl, supra note 47, at 1212-13 (discussing the Berne Convention Implementation Act).
53
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62

acted the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA), which provided certain
63
additional ‘moral rights’ to the creators of “work[s] of visual art.” In
1998, Congress passed the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
64
(CTEA), which extended the term of copyright protection for an
65
additional twenty years, as well as the Digital Millennium Copyright
66
Act (DMCA), which barred the circumvention of any “technological
measure that effectively controls access to a [copyright-protected]
67
work.”
Also during this time, there were several notable Supreme Court
cases that clarified the scope of the fair use doctrine. In Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., the Court expanded the doctrine
68
to include the “time-shifting” use of VCRs. In Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, the Court held that fair use did not extend to the publication of substantial excerpts from a forthcoming
69
work. And in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., the Court strongly re70
affirmed the principle that fair use covers parody.
The point of the preceding analysis is not merely to establish the
current state of copyright law; rather, it is to suggest that copyright
protection is evolving in a predictable, determinable pattern.
Copyrightable subject matter has grown from a brief list of qualifying art forms in 1790 (maps, charts, and books) to include both contemporary media that were already known at the time of the framing,

62

Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. VI, 104 Stat. 5128 (1990).
Id. § 603. Because of VARA’s narrow definition of “work of visual art,” these
rights are rarely litigated. See Suhl, supra note 47, at 1215 (noting that the statute is
“invoked only in very limited circumstances”).
64
Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998).
65
Id. § 102. The Supreme Court held that this did not violate the “limited Times”
constraint, even as applied to pre-existing works. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 194
(2003). For further discussion of Eldred, see infra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
66
Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified in part at 17 U.S.C. §§
1201-1205 (2000)). For contrasting views of the legislation, compare Electronic Frontier Foundation, Unintended Consequences: Five Years Under the DMCA (2003),
http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/unintended_consequences.pdf (criticizing the DMCA
for its chilling effect on free expression, its jeopardization of fair use rights, its imposition on competition and innovation, and its overbroad ban on legitimate computer
activities), with Orin S. Kerr, A Lukewarm Defense of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act in
COPY FIGHTS: THE FUTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 163
(Adam Thierer & Wayne Crews eds., 2002) (defending the DMCA).
67
17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2000).
68
464 U.S. 417, 421 (1984). “Time-shifting” refers to recording a program as it is
broadcast and watching it at a later time.
69
471 U.S. 539, 542 (1985).
70
510 U.S. 569, 578-85 (1994).
63

2006]

LIMITED TIMES

717

as well as later-developed media such as photographs, motion pictures, and computer software; and the current broadly worded statute
allows protection for any manner of creative expression capable of being fixed in a tangible medium. Although several states have ex71
tended copyright protection to unfixed works, federal expansion in
72
this area seems unlikely. However, it seems quite probable that the
subject-matter limitation will continue evolving to reflect an everbroader understanding of what may constitute an original work of au73
thorship.
The scope of copyright protection awarded to authors has similarly expanded from narrow publication and copying rights to include
broad coverage of derivative works. The institutional hurdles re74
quired to secure protection have decreased dramatically. And the
duration of protection has grown from a renewable fourteen-year
75
term to the life of the author plus seventy years.
Although these trends might suggest that the copyright universe is
expanding indefinitely, the limiting rules—such as the doctrines of
fair use, scénes à faire, and first sale, as well as the idea/expression dichotomy—all suggest a tipping point, after which the public’s interest
71

See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 980(a)(1) (West Supp. 2005) (expanding copyright
protection to include works that are not fixed in a tangible medium of expression).
72
Some scholars have suggested that fixation is not merely “a traditional requirement for federal statutory copyright protection” but is in fact “a constitutional requirement inherent in the Copyright Clause’s use of the word ‘Writings’ to describe the subject matter that Congress can protect pursuant to the Clause.” Thomas B. Nachbar,
Intellectual Property and Constitutional Norms, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 272, 285 (2004); see also
Joseph C. Merschman, Note, Anchoring Copyright Laws in the Copyright Clause: Halting the
Commerce Clause End Run Around Limits on Congress’s Copyright Power, 34 CONN. L. REV.
661, 677-92 (2002) (arguing that fixation is a constitutional requirement). The Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Moghadam accepted this premise arguendo but decided
the case on other grounds. 175 F.3d 1269, 1277 (1999).
Although the issue has not been brought squarely before the Supreme Court, in a
pre-1976 Act case the Court did suggest that a physical embodiment was required. See
Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973) (“[A]lthough the word ‘writings’
might be limited to script or printed material, it may be interpreted to include any
physical rendering of the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor.”).
73
For example, a district court recently held that copyright protection would be
available to a “sufficiently creative” sequence of yoga asanas. Open Source Yogan
Unity v. Choudhury, No. C 03-3182 PJH, 2005 WL 756558, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1,
2005).
74
See Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 494-95
(2004) (discussing the transition from a conditional copyright regime to an unconditional copyright regime).
75
Compare Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (renewable fourteenyear terms), with 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000) (life of the author plus seventy years).
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becomes supreme. However, while all of these doctrines serve to limit
the outer bounds of exclusive rights awarded to authors, none of them
act to resist the continual lengthening of copyright duration, and thus
this trend seems likely to continue. Moreover, the recognition that
certain aspects of a work should vest in the public domain immediately upon its creation only reinforces the intuition that those rights
that do not immediately vest are ones that society can afford to protect
with copyright indefinitely.
II. FOREVER AND A DAY: INDEFINITELY RENEWABLE COPYRIGHT
Building on the conclusion in Part I that the duration of copyright
protection is likely to continue expanding, this Part examines the
merits of advancing this pattern to its ultimate end and adopting a regime that would permit perpetual copyright protection.
Scholars have posited numerous justifications for creating property rights in intellectual goods. A Lockean approach suggests that
76
authors should be rewarded for the fruits of their labor. HegelianPersonhood theory argues that individuals achieve self-actualization
through their creative works and thus should have certain ‘moral
77
rights’ in their works even after creation. Professor Neil Netanel has
argued that copyright protection serves a structural function in a democratic society, ensuring the independence of authors and publishers and thereby establishing an important check on the ability of the
78
government to control the content and flow of information.

76

See Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51
OHIO ST. L.J. 517, 523-24 (1990) (“Since people owned their bodies, Locke reasoned
that they also owned the labor of their bodies and, by extension, the fruits of that labor.” (footnote omitted)).
77
See MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 34 (1996) (noting that
for Kant and Hegel, “only objects separate from the self are suitable for alienation”);
Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 971-72 (1982) (arguing that property affects an individual’s personhood, and therefore rights should be
maintained over property); see also G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 66 (T.M.
Knox trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1952) (1821) (“[T]hose goods, or rather substantive
characteristics, which constitute my own private personality and the universal essence
of my self-consciousness are inalienable and my right to them is imprescriptible. Such
characteristics are my personality as such, my universal freedom of will, my ethical life,
my religion.”). This theory is closely aligned with the European approach of providing
‘moral rights’ to authors. Suhl, supra note 47, at 1208-11.
78
See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J.
283, 352-53 (1996) (“By supporting a market-based sector of authors and publishers,
copyright achieves considerable independence from government administrators and
private patrons who would otherwise meddle in expressive content.”).
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Absent any constitutional limitation, Congress might seek to regulate copyright in order to pursue any one of these philosophical ends.
However, among all the powers granted to Congress in Section 8 of
Article I, the Intellectual Property Clause is unique in that it provides
not just a power (in this case, the ability to grant copyrights and patents) but also a particular philosophical rationale (and thus a possible
constraint upon Congress’s use of that power): “[t]o promote the
79
Progress of Science and useful Arts.” As a result, legislation enacted
pursuant to the Intellectual Property Clause is generally analyzed
solely from a consequentialist perspective: does it provide a sufficient
incentive for authors to create new works, and does it provide the pub80
lic with appropriate access to those works? However, these inquiries
are often limited by a presupposition that the utilitarian goals expressed in the Promote Progress Clause can only be achieved through
a limited term of protection that must inevitably result in all works ultimately passing into the public domain.
Professor William Landes and Judge Richard Posner have proposed a countervailing model that would allow copyrighted works to
81
remain protected indefinitely. Although indefinite protection could
be realized in numerous forms, their suggested framework would involve the reinstitution of formal requirements for copyright registration and renewal, with no set limit on the number of times an author
82
and her heirs or assignees could renew the copyright in the work.
This Part argues that the adoption of an indefinitely renewable copyright scheme would present numerous advantages over the current
framework, and moreover is preferable to the current practice of extending the copyright term every time the oldest protected works are
about to expire.
Unlike the other changes to copyright law proposed in this Comment, the reintroduction of formal requirements would represent a
79

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
See Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books,
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 282 (1970) (discussing these
ends as the twin goals of copyright law); see also Twentieth Century Music Corp. v.
Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded,
but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public
availability of literature, music, and the other arts.”); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S.
123, 127 (1932) (“The sole interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors
of authors.”).
81
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U.
CHI. L. REV. 471, 473 (2003).
82
Id.
80
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clear shift in the opposite direction of copyright law’s current trajec83
tory.
However, these requirements would serve several important
functions and would mitigate or eliminate many of the prime concerns generally raised in opposition to extended or perpetual terms of
copyright protection.
First, the reintroduction of registration and renewal would reduce
the tracing costs inherent in identifying the owner (or owners) of a
84
copyright in a given work. This is not generally a problem associated
with recently published commercial works (as most content owners
and distributors include copyright notices even though such affixation
85
is no longer required for copyright protection); however, tracing
costs are often cited as a reason not to extend the term of copyright
86
protection, based on the rationale that a longer term increases the
87
possibility that a copyrighted work will be “orphaned.” While this
88
may be true in the case of automatic extensions, requiring reasonably frequent renewal (for example, every ten or twenty years) would

83

See supra note 74 and accompanying text (noting that copyright law has evolved
in the direction of reducing and eliminating formalities).
84
Landes & Posner, supra note 81, at 477-78; see also LESSIG, supra note 2, at 288
(“Today, there is no simple way to know who owns what, or with whom one must deal
in order to use or build upon the creative work of others. . . . [T]hus, the lack of formalities forces many into silence where they otherwise could speak.”).
85
See Berne Convention Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 7, 102 Stat.
2853 (1988) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 401-406 (2000)) (modifying the
copyright scheme to make the affixation of copyright notice permissive rather than
required).
86
See, e.g., Hearings on S. 483 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 26
(1997) (testimony of Larry Urbanski, Chairman, American Film Heritage Association)
[hereinafter Urbanski Senate Testimony] (arguing that an increased term of protection
will increase the difficulty in preserving old films due to increased tracing costs).
87
“Orphan works” are generally defined as “copyrighted works where the rights
holder is hard to find.” Save Orphan Works, http://eldred.cc (last visited Jan. 20,
2006). These works present a problem for follow-on artists who wish to use them, since
the search costs associated with identifying copyright owners make the endeavor prohibitively expensive, “even when [the artist would] be willing to pay [a reasonable license fee] to use them. In many cases the works were abandoned because they no
longer produced any income. In most cases, rights holders, once found, are delighted
to have their work used.” Id.
One area where the problem has been particularly pronounced is film preservation, as many early films were produced by studios that are now defunct. See Urbanski
Senate Testimony, supra note 86, at 26.
The Copyright Office recently requested public comments for a study of orphan
works. Orphan Works, 70 Fed. Reg. 3739 (Jan. 26, 2005).
88
E.g., Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat.
2827 (1998) (automatically extending the term of copyright protection by twenty
years).
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actually reduce the tracing costs associated with the current life-plus89
seventy years term of protection.
Similarly, a transition from the current system to one that requires
renewal at regular intervals would likely lead to a large number of
90
works actually entering the public domain sooner. While critics of
copyright extension often complain that it ‘starves’ the public domain
91
by prolonging the time before works become free for public use,
given the sheer volume of material that potentially qualifies for copyright protection today (from e-mails to doodles to outgoing answering
92
machine messages ), it seems implausible that any more than a small
93
fraction of these works would be renewed even once.
This intuition is further supported by empirical data examining
works created and published prior to the 1976 Act. Of the works registered for copyright protection between 1883 and 1964, only ten percent were renewed at the end of their initial twenty-eight-year term of
94
protection. Although the cost of renewal may have been a significant deterrent for authors of composite works (such as a large series
of individually copyrighted photographs), in the vast majority of cases
it appears that the abandonment of copyright protection was due to
the “sheer bother of applying for renewal” rather than the renewal fee
95
(which grew from fifty cents in 1909 to the still modest $60 in 2002).
And yet, while the bulk of copyrighted works would eventually enter into the public domain, it remains a near certainty that the most
popular and valuable works would be renewed so long as they re96
mained commercially viable. Thus, it is important to focus on the
effect of allowing this select subset of works to remain in private control indefinitely. For these works, there are the basic concerns that, as
they grow more valuable over time, there would be increasing costs to
the public, in both the licensing fees that the copyright holder could

89

Landes & Posner, supra note 81, at 477-78.
Id. at 517-18.
91
See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 2, at 24-25.
92
These all could qualify for copyright protection as “original works . . . fixed in
[a] tangible medium of expression.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
93
See Landes & Posner, supra note 81, at 474 (arguing, based on empirical data,
that even under a regime in which copyrights could be renewed indefinitely, “few
would be renewed if even a slight fee were required,” and only “the most valuable
works would probably be renewed many times”).
94
Id. at 496-500.
95
Id. at 474 & n.10.
96
See id. at 473-74 (discussing data on the number of copyrights that have been
renewed).
90
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charge as well as the deadweight loss attributable to individuals being
97
unwilling or unable to pay the increased fees. Yet these problems
will persist in the current system as well, so long as Congress continues
in its trend of retroactively extending copyright protection.
Moreover, it is important to consider whether there may be a net
gain from allowing these works to be renewed indefinitely. Certainly,
from a Lockean perspective, such a change would represent an im98
provement; but might there be a utilitarian gain as well?
The notion that copyright protection ought to have an expiration
99
date is grounded in traditional monopoly concerns, leading many
scholars to assume that economic efficiency requires all copyrights to
100
be limited in duration.
While this assumption is at odds with traditional economic notions that valuable resources should be owned in
101
order to ensure “efficient exploitation and to avoid overuse,” it is
not self-evident that these monopoly concerns apply with equal force
to intangible “intellectual” goods.
Indeed, at first blush, intellectual property might seem to be immune to such concerns: the non-rival, non-extinguishable nature of
creative expression would seem to suggest that once in the public domain, a work could be exploited by any member of society in whatever
way she believed would maximize her own private value, without any
102
negative externalities.

97

Id. at 479-81.
See supra note 76 and accompanying text (discussing the Labor Theory of intellectual property ownership).
99
See Ochoa & Rose, supra note 18, at 922-28 (discussing debates over the ratification of the copyright provision of the Constitution and ensuing concerns about monopolies).
100
See Landes & Posner, supra note 81, at 471 (noting that this is a “widely accepted proposition”); see also Brief of George A. Akerlof et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 10-12, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), 2002 WL
1041846 (arguing that copyright term extension increases the social cost of monopoly); Jon M. Garon, Media & Monopoly in the Information Age: Slowing the Convergence at
the Marketplace of Ideas, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 491, 598 (1999) (“The trend toward greater information ownership and longer copyright terms will drive up the social
costs of new work and drive down the opportunity for works built on a shared public
experience.”).
101
Landes & Posner, supra note 81, at 475. See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968) (“Ruin is the destination toward
which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the
freedom of the commons.”).
102
See, e.g., Dennis S. Karjala, Statement of Copyright and Intellectual Property Law Professors in Opposition to H.R. 604, H.R. 2589, and S. 505, “The Copyright Term Extension Act”
9 (Jan. 28, 1998), available at http://homepages.law.asu.edu/~dkarjala/
98
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Yet content owners have long recognized that over-exposure reduces the total value of a creative work, and indeed, many copyright
holders seeking to maximize their profits do so by carefully restricting
their exploitation so as not to saturate and ultimately squander the
103
market for their work.
Similarly, research in behavioral economics
suggests that an over-abundance of choices reduces consumer information, making consumers more likely to choose nothing rather than
104
anything.
The point here is not to suggest that there is no value to be had
from works in the public domain, but rather that the utilitarian gains
from extended copyright protection could easily outweigh the losses.
Given the appropriation rights that are immediately available through
doctrines such as fair use, the remaining uses of copyrighted works
that are withheld from the public are those uses that the public can
most easily do without.
Although scholars tend to blanche at the possibility of a world in
105
which Sir Laurence Olivier could not play Hamlet, such hyperbolic
fears are almost certainly overstated. For example, it seems likely that
in a world with indefinitely renewable copyright protection, the market for copyright assignments would continue to grow, presumably
along the lines of what has already developed in the areas of musical
compositions and theatrical works, where large publishing houses
such as Samuel French specialize in acquiring and licensing protected
106
works.
Indeed, organizations generally thought of as resource-

OpposingCopyrightExtension/legmats/1998statement.html (“There can be no overgrazing of intellectual property . . . because intellectual property is not destroyed or
even diminished by consumption. Once a work is created, its intellectual content is
infinitely multipliable.”).
103
See, e.g., Bill Britt, Disney’s Global Goals, MARKETING, May 17, 1990, at 22 (discussing Disney’s efforts to extend the commercial life of its protected properties); see also
Landes & Posner, supra note 81, at 486-88 (demonstrating that congestion or overuse
externalities could decrease the total value of an intellectual property).
104
See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1477-79 (1998) (discussing
“bounded rationality”).
105
See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 2, at 29 (suggesting society is better off with the
works of Shakespeare in the public domain).
106
See generally Samuel French, Inc., Royalties and Rights Information (2004),
http://www.samuelfrench.com/store (follow “Royalty Information” hyperlink) (describing performance restrictions and royalty policies for Samuel French plays and musicals). Organizations such as the Copyright Clearance Center have made similar inroads in the information content industry. See, e.g., Copyright Clearance Center,
Corporate Overview: Copyright Clearance Solutions (2006), http://www.copyright.com/
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poor—such as schools and community theaters—are already able to
license some protected works because the publishing houses, seeking
to capture these smaller markets, employ a licensing structure that allows for price discrimination (based on factors such as theater size
107
and ticket price), making it commercially viable for all involved.
But since it is reasonable to assume that there will be market failures, it is important to consider what will be lost in the cases of works
that never enter the public domain and cannot be freely licensed.
The public is free to take any underlying ideas from those works (due
to the idea/expression dichotomy), as well as to copy as much as is
necessary for fair use purposes such as criticism and parody. Thus,
the public will lose only those appropriations that fail to meet the
thresholds of fair use.
This leads to two logical points: first, the standard for fair use
should be clearly defined so as to prevent copyright holders from
108
chilling acceptable expression; and second, the definition should be
broad enough to cover the class of expressions vital to society that
would otherwise be suppressed. While this Comment argues that the
contours of fair use should be adapted to better fit a regime of indefinitely renewable copyright, even under the current framework, if
something fails to meet the minimum standards to qualify for fair use,
it should be something that society can do without.
Scholars tend to reject this latter suggestion out of hand, citing
(depending on the level of cultural literacy they wish to intimate) ei109
ther West Side Story as an adaptation of William Shakespeare’s Romeo
110
111
112
and Juliet, or Clueless as an adaptation of Jane Austen’s Emma as

ccc/do/viewPage?pageCode=au1 (describing the company’s role as an “intermediary
between copyright owners and content users”).
107
This is not to say that there are not sometimes troubling conflicts within the
system. There is certainly a prevalent perception that the “best” copyrighted works
remain too expensive for resource-poor organizations to license. And reduced-fee licensees are often forced to accept strict restrictions. For an example from across the
pond that could plausibly happen stateside, see Tom Morgan, Why Grease Is Not the
Word, DAILY EXPRESS (U.K.), Nov. 30, 2004, at 26 (describing a school production of
Grease that was not allowed to advertise for fear of competing with a professional touring version).
108
This first point does not seem controversial, though it seems likely to play an
important role in establishing a regime of indefinitely renewable copyright. See infra
notes 151-53 and accompanying text (arguing that clarification of the fair use Doctrine
would address the primary concern regarding indefinitely renewable copyright).
109
LEONARD BERNSTEIN, WEST SIDE STORY (1957).
110
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MOST EXCELLENT AND LAMENTABLE TRAGEDY OF
ROMEO AND JULIET. For a description of West Side Story as “a modern update” of Romeo
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examples of works that would be lost under an indefinitely renewable
paradigm. Bracketing for a moment the question of whether or not
those expressions should qualify as derivative works infringing the
113
original copyright, the larger point is that, to the extent copyright
protection forces artists to be more creative in order to avoid infringement, the public has benefited. This depends in large part on
the idea/expression dichotomy; while the actual expression—
114
“Wherefore art thou Romeo?” —is protected, the underlying idea—
star-crossed lovers, things end badly—is immediately vested in the
public domain and free for appropriation. Thus, if Shakespeare’s
works were still under copyright protection, follow-on artists would be
free to rely on Shakespeare’s words and structure as inspiration, yet
they would be forced to add enough unique material or otherwise
115
substantially modify any portions they borrowed in order to create a
non-infringing work, with the marketplace rewarding the most successful innovations.
However, even assuming that the public can appropriately exploit
the most valuable copyrighted works (through fair use and the
idea/expression dichotomy), there remains the second half of the
question: would an indefinitely renewable copyright regime produce
a net benefit over the current system? There is, of course, a natural
inclination to be skeptical of a framework that would appear to represent a windfall to the holders of those copyrights with lasting value;
does the public receive any comparable benefit from the Walt Disney

and Juliet, see Broadway: The American Musical, Memorable Musicals,
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/broadway/musicals/westside.html.
111
CLUELESS (Paramount Pictures 1995).
112
JANE AUSTEN, EMMA (R.W. Chapman ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1933) (1816).
For a discussion of the influence of Emma on the director of Clueless, see Interview by
the American Film Institute with Amy Heckerling, Director of Clueless, in Los Angeles,
Cal. (Sept. 14, 1995), http://www.jasa.net.au/study/ahinterview.htm.
113
See infra note 146 and accompanying text (suggesting that under a narrow definition of derivative work, West Side Story and Clueless would not be considered infringements).
114
SHAKESPEARE, supra note 110, act 2, sc. 2.
115
To the extent that certain dramatic schemata are required in order to tell a
story, the scénes à faire doctrine holds that such takings do not constitute infringement. See, e.g., Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir.
1980) (finding that representations of the Hindenburg disaster did not constitute infringement, as similarities in portrayal were determined by the subject matter); see also
supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text (discussing the scénes à faire doctrine).

726

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 154: 705

Corporation’s continued ownership of rudimentary cartoons Walt
116
Disney made almost eighty years ago?
The answer may be yes. Beyond simply fostering a higher threshold of creativity for follow-on artists, indefinitely renewable protection
encourages copyright owners to promote, enhance, restore, and otherwise commercially exploit their protected works. For example, the
117
film It’s a Wonderful Life fell into the public domain after the expiration of its initial term of protection because “the copyright holder
118
failed to file a timely renewal application.”
As a result, there was no
quality control over the work: television stations severely edited the
film to make room for more commercials, and the broadcast picture
quality was poor because no one was willing to invest in restoring the
119
prints.
Moreover, consumers who purchased home video cassettes
120
of the film often unwittingly received low-quality bootlegs.
However, the copyright holders were able to reclaim the film from
the public domain by asserting their rights to the underlying short
121
story and music.
Subsequently, the copyright holders invested significant capital in producing a high-quality restoration of the film; this
was possible because the investment costs could be recouped through
122
the sale of exclusive distribution rights.
Thus, in at least some circumstances, the public as a whole would seem to derive certain benefits from the extension of private copyright ownership.
As a corollary to these issues related to indefinitely renewable
copyright, Congress would likely be able to generate a significant
amount of revenue by switching from the current system to one in
which copyright owners must pay a set fee for each renewal of their
copyright. Indeed, since there is generally a polarization in the value
of protected material over time (with most works tending towards ei-

116

E.g., PLANE CRAZY (Walt Disney Pictures 1928) (featuring the first appearance
of Mickey Mouse); STEAMBOAT WILLIE (Walt Disney Pictures 1928) (featuring the first
appearance of Mickey Mouse with synchronized sound). While Walt Disney provided
Mickey Mouse’s voice and personality, the character was actually designed and animated by Ub Iwerks. LESLIE IWERKS & JOHN KENWORTHY, THE HAND BEHIND THE
MOUSE 53-56 (2001).
117
IT’S A WONDERFUL LIFE (Liberty Films Inc. 1946).
118
Scott M. Martin, The Mythology of the Public Domain: Exploring the Myths Behind
Attacks on the Duration of Copyright Protection, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 253, 273 (2002).
119
Id.
120
Id. at 273-74.
121
Id. at 273.
122
Id. at 274.
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ther extremely high or extremely low value ), Congress would be
able to charge substantial fees for subsequent renewals without significantly altering the incentive structure created by an indefinitely re124
newable copyright regime.
What, then, to do with all of this money? Separate from the issues
previously discussed, creating an increasingly prominent role for libraries could be an important policy lever in an indefinitely renewable
125
framework.
There are, under the current system, already incentives
for copyright owners to register their works and deposit copies with
126
the Register of Copyrights and the Library of Congress.
But there
are no comparable measures currently contained within the legal infrastructure that facilitate the distribution of copyright-protected
works to public libraries. By redirecting money from renewal fees into
the public library system (and fostering a broader, more efficient inter-library loan system), this new framework could ensure that all
123

See Landes & Posner, supra note 81, at 474 (noting that most copyrights rapidly
depreciate in value).
124
While determining the proper amount of the fees is beyond the scope of this
Comment, it seems reasonable to assume that the cost of administering an indefinitely
renewable copyright system could be supported by renewal fees. The rent-seeking behavior of copyright owners whose copyrights were about to expire before the passage
of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act suggests that, rather than lobby
Congress for another extension every twenty years, they could just as easily spend that
money paying renewal fees. See Landes & Posner, supra note 81, at 483 (discussing
rent-seeking behavior). Moreover, given that some intellectual properties are valued at
over a billion dollars, it seems plausible that Congress could set ever-increasing renewal
fees that ultimately reached into the millions. See, e.g., DAN RAVIV, COMIC WARS:
MARVEL’S BATTLE FOR SURVIVAL 176-77 (2002) (recounting an industry insider’s estimation that the intellectual property rights to the character Spider-Man were worth
one billion dollars); David Rowan, A Small Bear with a Very Big Legal Bill, TIMES (U.K.),
Nov. 22, 2003, at 40, available at 2003 WLNR 4977416 (noting that the intellectual
property rights to the character Winnie the Pooh are estimated to be between one and
five billion dollars).
125
For a discussion on alternative ways libraries could be used to preserve culture,
see Alicia Ryan, Note, Contract, Copyright, and the Future of Digital Preservation, 10 B.U. J.
SCI. & TECH. L. 152, 160-65 (2004). There are, of course, various First Amendment
concerns that would follow from any reliance on the library system to disseminate all
works to all patrons. See, e.g., David Norden, Note, Filtering out Protection: The Law, the
Library, and Our Legacies, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 767 (2003) (examining First Amendment issues surrounding the use of internet filtering software in public libraries to filter out pornography).
126
17 U.S.C. §§ 407, 408 (2000). Although the statute incentivizes both registration and deposit, in order to remain in compliance with the Berne Convention, neither is a requirement for acquiring copyright protection. See Berne Convention, supra
note 47, art. III (setting requirements for contracting states that require registration
under their domestic law).
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copyrighted works are made available to the public for free immediately upon publication and registration. Indeed, while works in the
public domain are theoretically possessed by the public at large, there is
no guarantee that members of the public will actually have access to
them. Just as the underlying idea of a copyrighted work vests with the
public immediately, so too should the ability to access the copyrighted
work vest immediately as well.
Ultimately, an indefinitely renewable term of copyright protection
presents numerous advantages over the current system. While it is not
clear whether the benefits of switching to such a scheme would ultimately outweigh the costs if the extant framework were to remain
static, it seems likely that the current system will continue evolving in
the same direction of ever-increasing terms of protection without any
of the comparable benefits that would be derived from registration
and renewal. An indefinitely renewable framework is preferable to
this practice, in that it would better promote the utilitarian goals of
copyright law.
III. GIVE AND TAKE: FAIR USE AND DERIVATIVE WORKS
Although copyright law has grown and evolved in numerous ways
that have expanded the rights and benefits available to copyright
127
holders (such as lengthening the term of protection and broaden128
ing the scope of protectable subject matter ), the legal precepts that
have provided rights and benefits to the public (such as the fair use
129
doctrine) have remained relatively unchanged since their inception.
This Part argues that, in conjunction with the transition to a regime of
indefinitely renewable copyright, complementary modifications to the
scope of traditional copyright protection should also be instituted so
as to balance more evenly the needs of copyright holders with those of
content users.

127

Compare Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (providing a fourteen-year
term of copyright protection, renewable for one additional fourteen-year term) (repealed 1831), with Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298,
112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (providing copyright protection for the life of the author plus
seventy years).
128
See, e.g., Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 27, 35 Stat. 1175 (providing copyright
protection for motion pictures) (repealed 1976); Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96517, 94 Stat. 3015 (providing copyright protection for computer software).
129
The fair use doctrine codified in the 1976 Act is substantially similar to Justice
Story’s formulation in Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
See Madison, supra note 32, at 1588 (“Folsom gave us the syntax of fair use.”).
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130

As previously discussed, the derivative works and fair use doctrines evolved to determine which manner of non-identical copying
fell within the exclusive rights afforded to authors and which were
immediately permissible by the public. While recognition of derivative works protection addresses the problem of free riders who seek
131
merely to capitalize on the creative output of an artist, the fair use
doctrine seeks to carve out an exception for original works that draw
in part on protected expressions.
The four factors that Congress instructed courts to consider in determining whether a use should be deemed ‘fair’ are
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
132
copyrighted work.

Congress apparently intended to create a fluid standard that
133
134
could be adapted to changing times. As a result, numerous courts
135
and academics have struggled with the four factors’ intrinsic ambi-

130

See supra notes 21-35 and accompanying text (tracing the development of what
courts considered to be copyright infringement).
131
Such free rider exploitation would prevent authors from capturing the full
value of their works, thus reducing authors’ incentives to create works in the first place
and possibly driving them out of the market.
132
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). Although congressionally mandated, these factors are
all derived from the judicially created fair use exception. See Madison, supra note 32, at
1588 (noting that Justice Story’s Folsom opinion is “chiefly known [for] its formulation
of what has come down to us as the four statutory fair use factors”).
133
See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5680 (noting that “there is no disposition to freeze the doctrine in the statute, especially during a period of rapid technological change,” and further emphasizing that
“courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis”).
134
See, e.g., A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014-17 (9th Cir.
2001) (applying the factors from the 1976 Act to the facts of the case against Napster);
Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 918-32 (2d Cir. 1994) (analyzing
the four factors from the 1976 Act in the context of the infringement action against
Texaco).
135
See, e.g., William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1659, 1669-86 (1988) (discussing the relative importance of the four factors);
Gordon, supra note 34, at 1604 (“[T]he ambiguity of the fair use doctrine and its statutory formulation obscure the underlying issues and make consistency and predictabil-
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guity. The Supreme Court has most notably given guidance by stating
that the fourth factor is “undoubtedly the single most important ele136
ment of fair use.” While some scholars have criticized this emphasis
137
on the fourth factor, it can nevertheless be viewed as the magnetic
pole of fair use analysis, and one might speculate that, as copyright
protection evolves, the significance of the fourth factor will continue
to grow to the point that perhaps the other factors become irrele138
vant.
Complementing the argument in Part II that the copyright
extension trend should be hastened into an indefinitely renewable
copyright regime, this Part argues that such a scheme would best be
served by taking the fair use trend towards emphasizing the fourth factor to its ultimate conclusion as well.
A chief concern with an indefinitely renewable framework is that
certain types of expressions could be perpetually barred as infringing
the copyright of protected works. A fair use test based solely on the
fourth factor would ensure that the only expressions being suppressed
were those that would act as a substitute for works already present in

ity difficult to achieve.”); Madison, supra note 32, at 1550-64 (describing the interpretive difficulties posed by the statutory codification of the four factors).
136
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985). But
see Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (“[T]he more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.”). The Court in Campbell also
noted that “the four statutory factors [may not] be treated in isolation, one from another. All are to be explored, and the results weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright.” Id. at 578 (citations omitted). While some lower courts have
found significance in the Court’s failure to reiterate the importance of the fourth factor, see, e.g., Am. Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 926 (“Apparently abandoning the idea
that any factor enjoys primacy, Campbell instructs that ‘[a]ll [four factors] are to be explored, and the results weighed together . . . .’” (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578)),
others have continued to give that factor preeminence, see, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press
v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1385 (6th Cir. 1996) (“In determining
whether a use is ‘fair,’ the Supreme Court has said that the most important factor is
the fourth . . . .”).
137
See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law,
75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1077 (1997) (“The problem has been the tendency of the courts
to focus primarily on market harm to the copyright owner, to the exclusion of all
else.”).
138
At least one scholar has suggested that the fourth factor alone is already determinative in fair use analysis. See 1 MELVILLE NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT, § 1.10[D], at 1-152 (1984) (“Fair use, when properly applied, is limited to
copying by others that does not materially impair the marketability of the work that is
copied.” (footnote omitted)).
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139

the marketplace. In practice, this should result in a broader fair use
doctrine, protecting a wider array of works while excluding only those
that lack sufficient creativity to target a separate and distinct market.
However, this point highlights one of the problems inherent in a
fourth factor analysis: determining the relevant market for the fair
use analysis. A German translation of Uncle Tom’s Cabin might have
140
very little impact on the market for the English version.
On the
other hand, an audio recording of a novel might easily supplant the
market demand for the paperback equivalent, yet there might simul141
taneously be a distinct demand for the audio recording itself.
This
problem exists due to the broad protection currently given to derivative works. Thus, the proposed modification to the fair use doctrine
would best be achieved by simultaneously narrowing the scope of derivative works protection as well.
The simplest solution would be to stop extending copyright protection to derivative works entirely. Naomi Voegtli has suggested that
such rights are not necessary for an author to profit from ancillary
142
markets for her work.
She argues that lead time (and thus the opportunity to create derivative works prior to publication), as well the
ability to profit from goodwill associated with claims of authenticity
(which non-authors would be barred from doing under laws of unfair
143
competition), may provide sufficient compensation.
However, this
places a heavier burden on the author while primarily benefiting free
144
riders, an odd direction in which to move the law.
Ms. Voegtli of-

139

Moreover, these works would ideally be available via public libraries. See supra
notes 125-26 and accompanying text (suggesting that copyright renewal fees be used to
support the public library system).
140
See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text (discussing a court opinion rejecting an infringement claim based on a German translation of Uncle Tom’s Cabin).
141
For example, it seems likely that Michael Imperioli, a star of HBO’s mafiathemed drama The Sopranos, was enlisted to record the audio version of Mario Puzo’s
mafia-themed novel Omerta at least partly in order to capitalize on a segment of the
market that would not otherwise purchase the book. Mike Flaherty, Bold Soprano, ENT.
WKLY., June 16, 2000, at 87.
142
Naomi Abe Voegtli, Rethinking Derivative Rights, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1213, 124243 (1997).
143
Id. at 1242.
144
While the benefit to free riders could conceivably trickle down to the public, as
the commercialization of market substitutes would be likely to drive down prices and
reduce deadweight loss, that benefit would be offset by the decreased incentive to create new works, and moreover, a comparable benefit (without the corresponding loss)
could be achieved by making the actual works available for free through public libraries. See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text (discussing the role that public libraries could play in an indefinitely renewable copyright scheme).
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fers a better solution to the line-drawing problem with her suggested
redefinition of derivative work:
A “derivative work” is either (1) a work based significantly upon one or
more pre-existing works, such that it exhibits little originality of its own
or that it unduly diminishes economic prospects of the works used; or
(2) a translation, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgement, and
145
condensation.

This would scale nicely with the modified fair use analysis, providing protection to authors against derivative works that would act as a
market substitute for the author’s original expression, while still allowing follow-on artists to create new works inspired by existing art, so
long as they were infused with sufficient originality. Under such a
framework, West Side Story and Clueless would seem to be safe from
146
claims of infringement.
However, there would still be the question of how much a work’s
economic prospects would need to be diminished for it to rise to the
level of being ‘undue.’ For example, even if one assumed that Bridget
147
Jones’s Diary contained the necessary level of creativity to distinguish
148
it from Pride and Prejudice as a literary work, both novels have recently been adapted to films that were targeted at overlapping demo149
graphic groups. Thus, one might be tempted to argue for the seemingly perverse conclusion that the two films unduly compete for the
same market in a way that the novels do not. Yet so long as the question of whether a ‘borrowing’ work infringes the original is answered
solely by focusing on the fourth factor of the fair use analysis, any
seemingly illogical results thereby produced would merely be reflections of the differences in the market for each medium of expres150
sion.

145

Voegtli, supra note 142, at 1267.
See supra notes 109-15 and accompanying text (discussing works such as West
Side Story and Clueless, which are adaptations of earlier pieces).
147
HELEN FIELDING, BRIDGET JONES’S DIARY (1998).
148
JANE AUSTEN, PRIDE AND PREJUDICE (R.W. Chapman ed., Oxford Univ. Press
1960) (1813).
149
Compare BRIDGET JONES’S DIARY (Little Bird Ltd. 2001), with PRIDE AND
PREJUDICE (Working Title Films 2005).
150
The Supreme Court made roughly the same point in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., noting that while 2 Live Crew’s rap parody “Oh, Pretty Woman” did not infringe Roy Orbison’s non-rap non-parody “Oh, Pretty Woman,” it might nevertheless
have harmed the market for a theoretical rap non-parody version of the song, and thus
might still infringe Orbison’s exclusive right to derivative versions of the work. 510
U.S. 569, 577-79 (1994).
146
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Moreover, so long as courts are vigilant in protecting the original
work from market substitutes, this narrower conception of derivative
works should not significantly diminish the incentive structure of
copyright protection, even though it simultaneously provides the public with a wider array of creative expressions.
Finally, an ancillary concern with indefinitely renewable copyright
protection is that it would heighten current problems that exist due to
the ambiguity surrounding the contours of fair use. Professor Polk
Wagner has convincingly argued that both copyright owners and ap151
propriators are made worse off by the uncertainty of the doctrine.
In addition, as new technologies develop and new uses for creative
works arise, these uncertainties are magnified, and all parties experi152
ence a loss in perceived rights. However, this problem too could be
solved by shifting to a fair use test that relies solely on the fourth factor; such a test would increase clarity and certainty, and thus the value
153
of the works to all parties.
Ultimately, an indefinitely renewable copyright regime should be
paired with a modified conception of the proper scope of copyright
protection. An emphasis on the fourth fair use factor would
strengthen the economic incentive to create new works by providing
stronger financial protection for those works, while simultaneously
expanding the public domain by permitting any and all creative appropriations of those works that do not act as market substitutes. By
pairing duration extension with a new derivative works/fair use paradigm, both copyright owners and follow-on artists would be able to extract valuable elements from the intellectual property without depriving the other of significant benefits.
IV. CAN’T BUY ME LOVE:
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF UNLIMITED TIMES
The Intellectual Property Clause provides that Congress may grant
154
exclusive rights to authors for “limited Times.”
In Eldred v. Ashcroft,
the Supreme Court held that a single extension of retroactive copyright protection was not an attempt by Congress to “evade the ‘limited
151

See R. Polk Wagner, The Perfect Storm: Intellectual Property and Public Values, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 423, 427 (2005) (arguing that the uncertainty surrounding the scope
of copyright law has grown in recent years, potentially resulting in an erosion of fair
use principles and the concomitant social benefits, creating a “perfect storm”).
152
Id. at 429.
153
Id. at 434.
154
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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Times’ constraint by creating effectively perpetual copyrights through
155
repeated extensions,” but explicitly declined to address what might
156
constitute the “outer boundary of ‘limited Times.’” This Part speculates on the greatest extent of protection that might be permissible
under the Intellectual Property Clause, as well as the possibility of circumventing its limitations through the Commerce Clause.
There is some historical evidence to suggest that the Limited
Times Clause was not meant to be a restraint on Congress’s power at
all. By some accounts, the Clause was actually included simply to ensure that anyone interpreting the Constitution (especially those aware
of the Framers’ general aversion to monopolies) would understand
that the power to grant patent and copyright monopolies was meant
to be included within the subset of acts within Congress’s power un157
der the Intellectual Property Clause.
Nevertheless, such a reading
seems unlikely to carry the day, as it is clearly contrary to the Supreme
Court’s recent classification of the Clause as a constraint on Con158
gress.
Thus, the question should not be whether the Clause restrains Congress’s power, but rather, how?
In its most literal sense, the “limited Times” restriction would be
honored so long as copyright protection were granted for fixed terms
159
of years.
Indeed, the original draft of the Intellectual Property
160
Clause allowed Congress to grant protection for “a limited time”; by
amending the clause to instead read “limited Times,” the Framers
161
presumably intended to allow Congress to grant renewal terms.
And in fact, renewal terms were an integral part of the copyright
155

537 U.S. 186, 208 (2003).
Id. at 210 n.17 (2003); cf. 144 CONG. REC. H9952 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998) (statement of Rep. Mary Bono) (“Sonny wanted the term of copyright protection to last forever. I am informed by staff that such a change would violate the Constitution. . . . As
you know, there is also Jack Valenti’s proposal for term to last forever less one day.
Perhaps the Committee may look at that next Congress.”).
157
See Edward C. Walterscheid, Conforming the General Welfare Clause and the Intellectual Property Clause, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 87, 96 (1999) (arguing that “the additional
language is there because without it the delegates did not believe Congress would have
authority to grant patents and copyrights, regardless of how broad the authority ‘to
promote the progress of science and useful arts’ might on its face appear”).
158
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 208.
159
Landes & Posner, supra note 81, at 472.
160
See George Ramsey, The Historical Background of Patents, 18 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 6,
14 (1936) (“The original manuscript of [a] draft of the Constitution . . . discloses that
the original draft included the words ‘for a limited time.’”).
161
See id. (“There is no record as to why [the change in the ‘limited Times’ language] was made but we might guess that it was done for the purpose of permitting a
patent to be extended.”).
156
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scheme from 1790 to 1976. Thus, even a system of indefinitely renewable copyright might be permissible under the Intellectual Property
162
Clause. Nevertheless, this reading runs up against the problem that
the Framers seem to have clearly imagined that works protected by
163
this Clause would eventually fall into the public domain.
What, then, of extending copyright protection through another
164
grant of power, such as the Commerce Clause? The Supreme Court
has generally been skeptical of congressional attempts to do with one
power that which it has been explicitly barred from doing with an165
other.
Thus, the Court has read limitations into the Commerce
166
Clause from the Bankruptcy Clause, the Fifth Amendment’s Due
167
168
Process Clause, the Sixth Amendment’s right to trial by jury, and
162

See Landes & Posner, supra note 81, at 472 (postulating that the constitutional
limitation may be circumvented by allowing repeated extensions of the copyright
term). But see Malla Pollack, Unconstitutional Incontestability? The Intersection of the Intellectual Property and Commerce Clauses of the Constitution: Beyond a Critique of Shakespeare
Co. v. Silstar Corp., 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 259, 286 (1995) (arguing that such a reading is “conceivable, but strained”).
163
See Nachbar, supra note 72, at 330 n.251 (collecting sources).
164
The Supreme Court has clearly established that Congress may use the Commerce Clause to protect certain forms of intellectual property that may not be protected by the Intellectual Property Clause, such as trademarks. See The Trade-Mark
Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 97 (1879) (striking down a federal trademark statute as unconstitutional, but suggesting the possibility that a narrowly tailored statute limited to marks
used in interstate commerce would be acceptable); see also Lanham Trade-Mark Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1051 (2000) (limiting trademark protection to marks used in commerce);
New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 305 (9th Cir. 1992)
(“[T]rademarks have been covered by a comprehensive federal statutory scheme since
the passage of the Lanham Act in 1946”). Moreover, intellectual property protection
granted under the Commerce Clause could theoretically be infinite in duration. See
Dan Hunter, Culture War, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1105, 1109 n.24 (2005) (“Trademarks are
capable of infinite term since they may be repeatedly renewed.”).
165
See, e.g., EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 248 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(“Congress may not . . . transcend specific limitations on its exercise of the commerce
power that are imposed by other provisions of the Constitution.”); see generally Pollack,
supra note 162, at 270-74 (arguing that Congress does not have the power to bypass the
Intellectual Property Clause through the Commerce Clause).
166
See, e.g., Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 468-69 (1982)
(holding that Congress may not use the Commerce Clause to pass a non-uniform
bankruptcy law because the Bankruptcy Clause requires bankruptcy laws to be uniform).
167
See, e.g., Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 29-53 (1969) (holding that a provision of the Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act was unconstitutional because it violated the Fifth Amendment).
168
See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 582 (1968) (“Whatever might be
said of Congress’ objectives, they cannot be pursued by means that needlessly chill the
exercise of basic constitutional rights.” (citations omitted)).
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169

notions of state sovereignty inherent in the Tenth Amendment. Justice O’Connor has also suggested that limitations may be found in the
170
Twenty-first Amendment.
On the other hand, the Court has also noted that certain enumerated powers may simply overlap, and in those situations, restrictions
on the exercise of one power do not constrain Congress’s ability to act
171
pursuant to another.
For instance, the Court found that Congress
could circumvent the limitations of the Tax Clause—that all taxes be
“for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United
172
States” —by enacting tax legislation through the Commerce
173
Clause. This view, that the General Welfare Clause did not limit the
Commerce Clause, is especially significant given the close parallel between the General Welfare Clause and the Promote Progress
174
Clause.
In both cases, the Constitution grants Congress the power
to achieve an abstract goal and delineates a particular method by
which that ultimate goal might be achieved. Thus, just as the Su-

169

See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 555-56 (1985)
(noting that states “occupy a special and specific position in our constitutional system
and that the scope of Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause must reflect
that position”).
170
See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 218 (1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he regulation of the age of the purchasers of liquor . . . falls squarely within the
scope of those powers reserved to the States by the Twenty-first Amendment.” (citation
omitted)). The majority resolved the issue under the Spending Power and thus did
not reach the issue of the Twenty-first Amendment. Id. at 206.
171
The question of whether two grants of power overlap or if one limits the other
is generally resolved by an inquiry into whether an enumerated power contains an “affirmative” or “positive” limitation. See Nachbar, supra note 72, at 294-98; see also Paul J.
Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The Intellectual Property
Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119, 1124 (drawing a
distinction between those cases in which Congress “runs into barriers” from those in
which “Congress’s power just runs out”).
172
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
173
See Edye v. Robertson (Head Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580, 594 (1884) (holding
that Congress had the power to pass a law regulating immigration under its commerce
power and did not violate any other part of the Constitution in doing so). The case
remains viable for the proposition that taxes not levied for the “‘common defence and
general welfare’” are not an exercise of “‘the taxing power’” but rather “‘the mere incident of the regulation of commerce.’” Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Pub. Utility Comm’n,
899 F.2d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 595).
174
See Walterscheid, supra note 157. Admittedly, this argument relies on stale case
law, as the 1913 ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment provided Congress with a
broad taxing power unrestrained by the General Welfare Clause. Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court has held that the General Welfare Clause should be viewed as a “grant
of power” rather than as “a limitation upon congressional power.” Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 90 (1976).
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preme Court has found that taxes enacted outside the scope of the
General Welfare Clause may nevertheless be permissible under the
Commerce Clause, the door might similarly be open for copyright
protection beyond the Intellectual Property Clause to be properly justified under the Commerce Clause.
Professor Thomas Nachbar has argued for the general proposition
that the Intellectual Property and Commerce Clauses should be
viewed as overlapping grants of power and that the explicit constraints
in the Intellectual Property Clause should not be viewed as “affirma175
tive” limitations on other enumerated powers.
However, he nevertheless concedes that “there is a stronger textual argument for applying the ‘limited Times’ restriction to the whole of Section 8 than there
176
is for any of the Intellectual Property Clause’s other limits.”
Other
scholars have similarly concluded that the Commerce Clause may not
177
be used to circumvent the “limited Times” provision.
By most indications, such a move would be met with judicial skepticism as well. Already, the Eleventh Circuit, analyzing an antibootlegging statute passed under the Commerce Clause, suggested in
dicta that “the Commerce Clause could not be used to avoid a limitation in the Copyright Clause if the particular use of the Commerce
Clause (e.g., the anti-bootlegging statute) were fundamentally inconsistent with the particular limitation in the Copyright Clause (e.g., the
178
fixation requirement).”

175

Nachbar, supra note 72, at 297.
Id.
177
See, e.g., Pollack, supra note 162, at 270-99 (arguing that the Commerce Clause
cannot be used to grant exclusive rights in a way that undermines the explicit “limited
Times” language in the Promote Progress Clause); see also Heald & Sherry, supra note
171 (arguing that the individual constraints of the Intellectual Property Clause may not
be circumvented through the use of other enumerated powers).
178
United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1280 n.12 (11th Cir. 1999). Although this portion of the opinion states that the fixation requirement is inherently
contained in the Constitution’s use of the term “Writings,” elsewhere the court notes
that it is assuming this position arguendo but deciding the case on other grounds. Id. at
1277; see also supra note 72 (discussing the fixation requirement).
The Southern District of New York more directly confronted the issue of whether
the anti-bootlegging statute could be supported by the Commerce Clause and concluded that it could not. See United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 424-29
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding the anti-bootlegging statute unconstitutional because it directly violates both the Copyright Clause’s fixation and durational restrictions).
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Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the anti-bootlegging
179
statute, and courts have been similarly generous in their appraisal of
Congress’s ability to provide copyright-like protection via the Com180
merce Clause, most notably with the DMCA.
Despite substantial
181
skepticism, courts have consistently upheld the statute in the face of
constitutional challenges arguing that its protection violates the Arti182
cle I, Section 8 “limited Times” constraint.
Moreover, courts have recognized in other contexts that the Intellectual Property Clause does not act as a restraint on Congress’s other
powers. For example, in Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., the
Federal Circuit held that the Intellectual Property Clause, by empowering Congress to promote progress through the grant of patents and
copyrights, did not prevent Congress from promoting progress
through other means, such as government sponsorship of research
183
and development.
Finally, there is a fundamental structural constraint on the term
“limited Times.” Congress is not simply empowered to grant copyrights, but rather “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
184
185
Arts,” with the ability to secure copyrights “for limited Times” pro186
vided as a means to that end.
Thus, if Congress were explicitly acting to pursue a different philosophical end, such as protecting the

179
See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1271 (“[W]e reject Moghadam’s constitutional challenge, and therefore affirm Moghadam’s conviction.”). Contra Martignon, 346 F. Supp.
2d at 429-30 (concluding that the anti-bootlegging statute is unconstitutional).
180
Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998); see supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text (discussing the DMCA).
181
See, e.g., Joshua Schwartz, Thinking Outside the Pandora’s Box: Why the DMCA Is
Unconstitutional Under Article 1, § 8 of the U.S. Constitution, 10 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 93, 96
(2005) (arguing that, by allowing copyright holders to prevent the public from ever
copying a work, the DMCA is in “direct contravention of the limited times” provision
of the Constitution).
182
See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 444-45 (2d Cir.
2001) (refusing to disturb the district court’s grant of an injunction under the DMCA
despite appellants’ challenge based on the Copyright Clause); United States v. Elcom
Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1137-42 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (upholding the DMCA against a
constitutional challenge because it was within Congress’s commerce power and was not
irreconcilably inconsistent with any provision of the Intellectual Property Clause).
183
848 F.2d 1560, 1564-65 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“Ample constitutional power for Government funding of research and development can be found in art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (provide for the common Defense and general Welfare), cl. 3 (Commerce), cl. 12 (Army),
cl. 13 (Navy) and cl. 18 (necessary and proper clause).”).
184
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
185
Id.
186
Walterscheid, supra note 157, at 125.
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187

‘moral rights’ of artists, then the “limited Times” constraint would
188
not necessarily be applicable.
Promulgating an indefinitely renewable copyright scheme under
the Commerce Clause would philosophically harmonize the system
with the modified conception of copyright protection proposed in
Part III, which measures the metes and bounds of that protection
solely by analyzing the market substitution effects of potentially infringing works. Moreover, a Commerce Clause scheme would be
more or less limited to governing only those works sold through
189
channels of interstate commerce, which would be a minuscule fraction of the works that currently receive federal protection through
statutes promulgated pursuant to the Intellectual Property Clause.
Thus, a Commerce Clause copyright system could act concurrently
with the current Intellectual Property Clause copyright framework,
with qualifying works eligible for protection under either statutory
scheme.
At its heart, indefinitely renewable copyright hinges on the finding that extending the duration of protection would promote the consequentialist goals of copyright law. The ultimate purpose of the Limited Times Clause is, after all, to provide Congress with the power to
190
satisfy the utilitarian Promote Progress Clause.
Thus, whether an
indefinitely renewable copyright scheme were to be promulgated under either the Intellectual Property Clause or the Commerce Clause,
187

See supra note 63 (discussing ‘moral rights’).
See Moral Rights in Our Copyright Laws: Hearings on S. 1198 and S. 1253 Before the
Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st
Cong. 38-39 (1989) (statement of Edward J. Damich, Associate Professor, George Mason University) (arguing that ‘moral rights’ do not fall under the auspices of the Intellectual Property Clause and thus could be granted for an infinite duration); Edward J.
Damich, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: Toward a Federal System of Moral Rights Protection for Visual Art, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 945, 993 (1990) (“[A]lthough the Copyright
Clause of the United States Constitution speaks of ‘limited times,’ moral rights arguably are not strictly copyright rights, that is, economic rights. Therefore, moral rights
could last in perpetuity. Furthermore, insofar as moral rights protection indirectly
benefits art preservation, perpetual protection is appropriate.”).
189
See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608-09 (2000) (discussing the limits
of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 558-59 (1995) (same).
190
The meaning of “progress” nevertheless remains subject to dispute, with both
authors and putative infringers claiming that their use of a copyrighted work furthers
the ultimate goal of the Clause. See John D. Shuff & Geoffrey T. Holtz, Copyright Tensions in a Digital Age, 34 AKRON L. REV. 555, 555-56 (2001) (explaining that authors argue that copyright provides an economic incentive to create works and that infringers
argue that progress is promoted by the most widespread public dissemination of
works).
188
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there would be a strong structural argument against binding Congress
to a narrow interpretation of “limited Times” that undermined its
ability to simultaneously benefit both copyright owners and content
users. If one were to accept that these two clauses were in conflict, it
seems reasonable to conclude that the “limited Times” constraint
should be interpreted in a manner subservient to the Promote Progress Clause.
CONCLUSION
Copyright law is evolving along several clear axes. Based on its
current trajectories, the duration of protection will continue to grow
while the fourth factor will increasingly dominate fair use analysis.
These trends should be carried out to their ultimate bounds, in a
scheme that permits copyrights to be renewed an unlimited number
of times, but provides protection only against works that would act as
market substitutes for the original. Such a framework presents numerous advantages over the current system, especially if Congress continues its practice of granting retroactive copyright extensions each
time the extant term is about to expire. Ultimately, the proposed
schema seeks to maximize social wealth by reconceptualizing and reallocating the rights associated with copyright protection, providing
both copyright owners and content users with increased protection for
the rights that they value most.

